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Illinois' Confrontation With the Use of
Closed Circuit Testimony in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases: A Legislative Approach to the
Supreme Court Decision of People v.
Fitzpatrick
INTRODUCTION

Reports of child sexual abuse have greatly increased in recent years.'
Currently, the number of annually reported cases, throughout the country,
exceeds 140,000.2

Despite the horrible suffering children undergo from

sexual abuse, they are likely to suffer additional emotional distress as a
result of testifying at trial, in the presence of their attacker. The emotional
trauma associated with facing their abuser often renders children unable to
provide coherent testimony at trial. Because the child victims are usually
the only witnesses, without their testimony, prosecution of this reprehensible

1. See Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Ass'n in Support of Neither
Party at 8 n.2, Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (No. 89-478). In 1976, child
protection agencies nationwide reported 1,975 cases of child sexual abuse. Id. Reports
increased to 127,000 cases by 1985, and 132,000 cases in 1986. Id.
2. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NAT'L CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE AND

NEGLECr, "Child Maltreatment 1993: Reports From the States to the National Center on
Child Abuse and Neglect" (1995). Specifically, in the state of Illinois, the number of
reported cases of child sexual abuse in 1993 was 5,341. Telephone Interview with Claire
Reynolds, Communications Intern, Illinois Department of Child and Family Services (July
21, 1995).
3. See Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Ass'n in Support of Neither
Party, supra note 1, at 10. The symptoms of their victimization include sleep and eating
disorders, fears and phobias, depression, guilt and deficiencies in school. Id. "Authorities
have long believed that a significant amount of trauma ...experienced by the child witness
is due to the presence and proximity of the accused." Id. at 13. However, not all children
are adversely affected from testifying in the presence of their abusers and psychologists
believe that some children may benefit from the experience. Id. For an additional discussion
of the trauma experienced by child victims as witnesses, see Claudia L. Marchese, Child
Victims of Sexual Abuse: Balancing a Child's Trauma Against a Defendant's Confrontation
Rights-Coy v. Iowa, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 411 (1990).
4. Carol A. Chase, Confronting Supreme Confusion: Balancing Defendants'
Confrontation Clause Rights Against the Need to Protect Child Abuse Victims, 1993 UTAH
L. REv. 407, 407 (1993).
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crime is difficult.'
In order to combat the problems associated with prosecuting child
sexual abuse crimes, many states have enacted statutes permitting alternative
procedures for the presentation of the victim's testimony. One specific
procedure has allowed children to testify outside the presence of the
7
defendant, via one-way closed circuit television; however, a direct obstacle
to this procedure has been the accused's constitutional right of confrontation.
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the use of one-way
closed circuit television does not violate a defendant's right to confrontation
under the Sixth Amendment.8 However, in 1994, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that this procedure violated an accused's right to confrontation
under the Illinois Constitution.9 Consequently, the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court was reversed after the Illinois electorate voted to amend the0
television.'
Illinois Constitution so as to permit the use of closed circuit
This article discusses an accused's rights under the Illinois Confrontation Clause and the need to protect child sexual abuse victims from the
emotional trauma associated with testifying in the presence of their abuser
at trial. Part I traces the history of both the Federal and Illinois Confrontation Clauses. Part II presents the facts and opinion of the People v.
Fitzpatrick" decision and Part III analyzes the opinion. Part IV explores
the Illinois legislature's response to the decision. Part V suggests some
practical implications of Illinois' struggle between a defendant's confrontation rights and the state's interest in protecting child victims of sexual abuse.

5. See Marchese, supra note 3.
6. Id. As of 1990, thirty-seven states provided for the use of videotaped testimony
of sexually abused children; twenty-four states enacted statutes allowing the use of one-way
close circuit television testimony in child abuse cases; and eight states authorized the use
of a two-way sytem in which the child is permitted to see the courtroom and the defendant
on a video screen and in which the jury and judge are permitted to view the child during the
testimony. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853-54 (1990).
7. See MD. CODE ANN., [CTs. & JUD. PROC.] § 9-102 (1989).
8. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). For a discussion of Craig, see infra
notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
9. People v. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d 685 (Il1. 1994) (finding that the procedure
violated ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.).
10. For a discusion of the amendment to Art. I, § 8 of the Illinois Constitution, see
infra notes 180-190 and accompanying text.
11. 633 N.E.2d 685 (Il. 1994). For a discussion of Fitzpatrick,see infra notes 96-179
and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him."'" The main
purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting the evidence to rigorous
testing.1 3 This goal is attained by: (1) requiring that a witness will provide
testimony under oath--thus impressing the witness with the seriousness of
the matter and guarding against the possibility of perjured testimony; (2)
forcing a witness to submit to cross-examination; and (3) allowing the jury
to observe the demeanor of the witness as testimony is given, thus aiding
the jury in assessing the credibility of the witness. 4 In addition to
ensuring the reliability of the evidence, the Confrontation Clause also allows
defendants to see their witnesses face-to-face. 5
1. Requirement of a face-to-face meeting
Although the Sixth Amendment does not expressly provide for a
face-to-face confrontation, the Supreme Court has interpreted this meaning
to be implicit.' 6 One of the earliest cases that interpreted the Sixth
Amendment as providing a right to a face-to-face confrontation was Kirby
v. United States. 17
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S 836, 845 (1990). In Craig, the Court held that the
Confrontation Clause is not violated in child sexual abuse cases where the child testifies
against the defendant, outside the defendant's physical presence, by one-way closed circuit
television. Id. at 857.
14. Id. at 845-46 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)). In Green,
the Court summarized the purposes of the Confrontation Clause and held that admission of
a declarant's out-of-court statements does not violate the Confrontation Clause, as long as
the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full cross-examination. Green, 399 U.S.
at 158. For a discussion of Green, see infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
15. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988).
16. Id: see also Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (describing a
provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights as being the same as the Sixth Amendment in that

they both provide an accused the right to meet witnesses face-to-face at trial); Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895) (stating that the substance of the Confrontation
Clause is preserved once the defendant has seen the witness face-to-face and subjected him
to cross-examination).
17. 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
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In Kirby, the defendant was indicted for the receipt of stolen property.'" At trial, the government attempted to prove the property received by
the defendant was stolen by offering as evidence, the record of the
conviction of three other individuals for the theft of the property in
question. 9 The Court, in ruling this procedure violated the defendant's
right to confrontation, explained: "[A] fact which can be primarily
established only by witnesses cannot be proven against an accused . . .
except by witnesses who confront him at the trial, upon whom he can look
,,20 More recently, in Coy v. Iowa,2' the Court
.
while being tried
observed that "[w]e have never doubted ... that the Confrontation Clause
guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing
before the trier of fact." 22 Even though the drafters of the United States
Constitution did not include the words "face-to-face" in the Sixth Amendment, it is clear by subsequent Supreme Court decisions, that a right to a
face-to-face meeting is inherent in the Confrontation Clause. However, the
Supreme Court has also emphasized that the right of confrontation is not
without limits, and that the primary concern of the provision is the right of
cross-examination. 23 Though the right to confrontation is fundamental to
American jurisprudence, our law has always recogized exceptions to this
right.
2. Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause
The most common and oldest exceptions 24to the right of confrontation25
States
are the exceptions to the rule against hearsay. Mattox v. United
0

18. Id. at 47-48.
19. Id. at 49-51. In Kirby, three men had broken into a post office and had taken
3,750 postage stamps, which were then given to the defendant, Joe Kirby. Id.
20. Id. at 55.
21. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). For a discussion of Coy, see infra notes 57-59 and
accompanying text.
22. Id. at 1016.
23. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (quoting in part from Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)); see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)
"The opponent demands confrontation, not for the idle purposes of gazing upon the witness,
Id. (quoting
or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination ....
5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395 (3d ed. 1940)).
24. For a complete treatment of the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and
the Hearsay Rule, see Michael H. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and
Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: the State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523
(1988). In addition to hearsay exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, the right of
confrontation may be lost through a defendant's consent or misconduct. See Illinois v. Allen,
397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970) (holding that a defendant, who continues to be disruptive at trial
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was one of the first Supreme Court cases that recognized hearsay exceptions
as exceptions to the Confrontation Clause. Mattox involved testimony given
at the defendant's first trial by two witnesses who had died by the time of
the second trial.26 At the defendant's second trial the court allowed into
evidence a court reporter's notes of the earlier testimony of the deceased
witnesses.27 Upon review, the Supreme Court ruled that this procedure did
not deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to confrontation, because
he had the opportunity to see the witnesses face-toface at the first trial and
subject them to cross-examination.2 s In fact, in this early examination of
the Confrontation Clause, the Court conceded that "rules of law of this kind,
however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused, must
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities
of the case." 29 In Mattox, the Court emphasized that the Sixth Amendment
is not without limitation, as it referred to the importance of dying declarations as exceptions to the Confrontation Clause.30
Since Mattox, the Court has provided additional guidelines for allowing
hearsay without violating the right of confrontation. In deciding whether the
admission of out-of-court statements violates the Confrontation Clause, the
courts examine the availability of the declarant and the reliability of the

after being warned, can lose the right to be present).
25. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
26. Id. at 240; see also Anthony S. Parise, Note, Maryland v. Craig: Ignoring the
Letter and Purpose of the Confrontation Clause, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1093, 1094 (1991)
(summarizing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895)).
27. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240.
28. Id. at 244. This exception for former testimony is presently codified as rule
804(b)(1) in the Federal Rules of Evidence. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
29. Id. at 243. Justice Brown interpreting the circumscription of the Bill of Rights
stated:
Many of its provisions in the nature of a bill of rights are subject to
exceptions, recognized long before the adoption of the constitution, and not
interfering at all with its spirit. Such exceptions were obviously intended
to be respected. A technical adherence to the letter of a constitutional
provision may occasionally be carried further than is necessary to the just
protection of the accused, and further than the safety of the public will
warrant.
Id.
30. Id. Dying declarations are statements made by a person who is about to die, in
reference to the manner in which he received the injuries, the cause of his death, or who
inflicted the injuries. BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 283 (6th ed. 1990). Dying declarations
are admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because "the sense of
impending death is presumed to remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict
an adherence to the truth as would the obligation of an oath." Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244.
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statement.3" That is, either the witness must be available at trial to testify
concerning the out-of-court statement or there must be a showing that the
statement is reliable.32
In California v. Green,33 the Court addressed the issue of whether a
prior inconsistent statement of a witness could be admitted at trial where the
witness was available to testify. In Green, a witness had testified adversely
toward the defendant at a preliminary hearing, but the witness was
uncooperative at trial and claimed he could not remember events described
The trial court permitted the State to
during his previous testimony.'
introduce the prior testimony of the witness for the truth of the matter
contained therein.35 On review, the Supreme Court held that a statement
of a witness made at a preliminary hearing, under oath and subject to full
cross-examination by an adequately counseled defendant was admissible in
the defendant's trial without violating the Sixth Amendment. 6
Six months after Green, in Dutton v. Evans,37 the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether an out-of-court statement could be admitted
when the declarant was available but did not testify. Here, one of the
prosecution's witnesses testified that he shared a prison cell with the
defendant's co-conspirator.3" The witness testified to statements made to
him by the co-conspirator whom incriminated the defendant. 39 The
31. Graham, supra note 24, at 539. Before even getting to the confrontation issue, an
out-of-court statement must fall under a permissible hearsay exception of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Id. at 526-30.
32. Graham, supra note 24, at 539. If a witness claims a loss of memory, asserts a
privilege, or is unwilling to testify, the witness is considered unavailable and the statement
must be shown to be reliable. Id.
33. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
34. Id. at 151-52. At the preliminary hearing, the witness had testified that the
defendant supplied him with marijuana to sell. Id. at 151. However, at trial the witness
claimed he was on LSD at the time of the transaction and could not remember how he
obtained the marijuana. Id. at 152.
35. Id. at 152 (admitting the statement under section 1235 of the California Evidence
Code). Section 1235 permits limited inconsistent statements to be admitted into evidence.
CAL. EviD. CODE § 1235 (West 1995).
36. Green, 399 U.S. at 165 (finding that the statement at the preliminary hearing was
given under circumstances similar to those surrounding a typical trial).
37. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). The defendant and two other men were charged with the
murder of three police officers. Id. at 76. One of the accused had been granted immunity
in exchange for cooperation with the prosecution. Id. at 77. The other was granted a
separate trial. Id.
38. Id. at 77.
39. Id. The witness had asked the co-conspirator how court was going and the
co-conspirator replied, "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we
wouldn't be in this now." Id.
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co-conspirator was not called to testify.' The Supreme Court held that the
admission of the witness's testimony did not violate the Confrontation
Clause because the testimony contained sufficient indicia of reliability so as
to assure "the trier of fact has a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of
41
the out-of-court statement.
The relationship between the Confrontation Clause and hearsay
exceptions was further examined in Ohio v. Roberts.42 In Roberts, a
defense witness had testified adversely toward the defendant at a preliminary
hearing, in spite of extensive examination by defense counsel. 43 This
witness could not be produced at trial, despite several attempts made by the
State.44 Subsequently, the trial court permitted the State to introduce the
witness's prior testimony through the use of the preliminary hearing
transcript. 45 The Supreme Court ruled that the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony did not infringe upon the defendant's constitutional
rights, but required that the testimony bear a sufficient "indicia of reliability"
and that the State make a good faith showing that the witness is unavailable. 46 Furthermore, the Court stated, "reliability can be inferred . . .
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. '47 In
all other cases, there must be a particularized showing of trustworthiness. 48
40. Id. at 100 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
41. Id. at 89. In finding a sufficient "indicia of reliability" the Court noted that the
co-conspirator's statement was spontaneous, against his penal interest to make it and
suggested no apparent reason why he should lie; thus, it could be effectively established
through the testimony of another witness. Id. at 88-9. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2), statements by a co-conspirator are considered to be admissions by a party-opponent and not hearsay. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2).
42. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
43. Id. at 58. The defendant had been charged with forgery of a check and possession
of stolen credit cards. Id. At the preliminary hearing defense counsel unsuccessfully
attempted to get the witness to admit that she had given the defendant the checkbook and the
credit cards with the understanding that he could use them. Id. Instead, the witness denied
giving the checks and credit cards to the defendant and this testimony was used at trial to
rebut the defendant's assertion that she gave them to him. Id. at 58-59.
44. Id. at 59. The State sent five subpoenas for four different trial dates but the
witness never responded. Id.
45. Id. at 60.
46. Id. at 65-66.
47. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (noting that the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules
generally protect the same interests and that basis for hearsay exceptions "comports with the
'substance of the constitutional protection."' (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
244 (1895))).
48. Id. The Court found the statement was trustworthy because defense counsel had
extensively questioned the witness at the preliminary hearing and the form of the questioning
comported with the principal purpose of cross-examination. Id. at 70-71.

726
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Six years after Roberts, in United States v. Inadi,49 the Supreme Court
was presented with the question of whether the Confrontation Clause
requires the prosecution to show that a nontestifying co-conspirator is
unavailable to testify, as a condition for admission of that co-conspirator's
out-of-court statements.5 ° In Inadi, the defendant was charged with
conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine.5' At trial the
prosecution introduced taped conversations between various members of the
alleged conspiracy without demonstrating that the declarants were unavailable to testify.52 The Supreme Court, per Justice Powell, held that the
Confrontation Clause does not require a showing of unavailability as a
condition to admission of out-of-court statements in the case of nontestifying
co-conspirators.5 3 The Court noted that co-conspirator statements derive
their value largely from the fact that they are made in a context very
different from trial, and thus are usually irreplaceable as substantive
evidence.5 4 Moreover, their admission into evidence "actually furthers the
Confrontation Clause's mission of advancing the truth-determining process
in criminal trials." 55 Up until Inadi, the majority of the Court's encounters
with the Confrontation Clause had involved the admissibility of out-of-court
statements.56
3. Constitutionalityof Child Shield Statutes
In Coy v. Iowa,5 ' the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
the Confrontation Clause prevented children, victimized by sexual abuse,
from testifying behind a screen that blocked them from seeing the defendant,
but allowed the defendant to see them dimly. The Court, per Justice Scalia,
held that this procedure violated the defendant's constitutional right to
face-to-face confrontation because the statute which provided for this
For a criticism of the Inadi decision see Marilyn
49. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
Feuchs-Marker, United States v. Inadi: Co-Conspirators Lose the Battle Between the
Confrontation Clause and Hearsay, 21 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 543 (1988).
50. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 388.
51. See id., at 388-89.
52. Id. at 390.
53. Id. at 400.
54. Id. at 395-96. Statements made by a co-conspirator in furtherance of illegal aims
could seldom be elicited from the declarant at a trial because of the potential threat to the
declarant's own interests. Id.
55. Id. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985)).
56. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988). For a detailed analysis of the Coy
decision, see Glenn H. DeAtley, Constitutional Confrontation as Defined in Coy v. Iowa'The Eyes Have It," 11 WHrrrER L. REV. 665 (1989).
57. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
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procedure imposed a presumption of necessity so as to protect children,
instead of requiring an individualized finding that these particular witnesses
needed special protection.58 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
noted that the procedure might withstand a constitutional challenge if the
statute required a case-specific finding of necessity.59 This situation was
precisely the issue presented two years later in Maryland v. Craig.'
In Craig,the defendant was charged with sexual abuse of a six-year-old
child.6 ' Prior to trial, the State moved, pursuant to Maryland statutory law,
to allow the child to testify via one-way closed circuit television.62 To
support this motion, the State was required to demonstrate the individual
need of the child to testify outside the presence of the defendant so as to
avoid serious emotional distress.63 The State met this burden by presenting
expert testimony that established that the child would suffer severe
emotional trauma such that she would not be able to reasonably communicate. 6' The trial court granted the State's motion and allowed the procedure in accordance with the statutory requirements.6 5 Subsequently, a jury
convicted Craig on all charges. 66
Upon a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court, per Justice O'Connor,
began its analysis by stating that "the Confrontation Clause guarantees the
defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier
of fact,"67 but also noted that, "in certain narrow circumstances, competing
interests, if closely examined, may warrant dispensing with confrontation at
trial."
The Court then found that the instant case was one of those
"narrow circumstances" that justified the restriction of the defendant's
58. See id. at 1020-21.
59. See id at 1025 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
60. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990).
61. Id. at 840.
62. Id. The Maryland statute provided for the child, prosecutor, and defense counsel
to withdraw to another room, where the child is to be examined and cross-examined; the
judge, jury, and defendant are to remain in the courtroom but can view the testimony via
one-way closed circuit television, and the defendant may communicate with counsel
electronically. Id. at 842. (referring to MD. CODE ANN., [CTS. & JUD. PROC.] § 9-102

(1989)).
63. Craig, 497 U.S. at 841.
64. Id. at 842.
65. See id. at 843.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 844 (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. at 1016).
68. Id. at 848 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) and Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)). A defendant's disruptive behavior at trial is an
example of a circumstance that may warrant an intrusion into the right of confrontation. See
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
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confrontational rights.' Specifically, the Court examined the prominence
of psychological trauma associated with children testifying in the presence
of those who have sexually abused them,7 ° and held that where necessary
to protect a child witness from emotional distress that could impair the
child's ability to communicate, the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit
the use of one-way closed circuit television, provided that the defense has
an opportunity of rigorous cross-examination. 1
Since its inception, the enduring purpose of the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause has been to ensure the reliabilty of evidence against
a criminal defendant by subjecting the evidence to rigorous testing through
the use of cross-examination. Over the past one hundred years, the United
States Supreme Court has recognized the following exceptions to the
provision's implicit guarantee to a face-to-face confrontation at trial: (1)
hearsay exceptions; (2) a defendant's disruptive behavior at trial; and (3)
child shield laws. However, each of these exceptions is consistent with the
main purpose of the Confrontation Clause in that they preserve the reliability
of the evidence used against an accused. In addition to the United States
Constitution, the right of an accused to confront witnesses face-to-face has
been included in each of the individual state constitutions.
B.

HISTORY OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE OF THE ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTION

Unlike its federal counterpart, the Confrontation Clause of the Illinois
Constitution provides: "In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
'
right . . . to meet the witnesses face-to-face. 72
This provision has
remained unchanged since it was originally drafted for the 1818 Illinois
Constitution." In fact, there is little historical debate on this enduring
right. In response to the lack of historical commentary, one legal analyst
contends that the right is "so basic, so well known, so intuitively understood
as indispensable to a free society, that any explanation . . . would be an
affront to the Convention delegates."74
One of the earliest cases that was faced with a question under the
Illinois Confrontation Clause was People v. Ferguson." In Ferguson, the

Craig, 497 U.S. at 855.
See id. at 854-57.
Id. at 857.
ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. I, § 8 (1970).
See GEORGE D. BRADEN & RUBIN G. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTrrUTION:
ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 39 (1969).
74. Id. at 42.
75. 101 N.E.2d 522 (II1.1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 910 (1952).
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

AN
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defendant was convicted of burglary in the Circuit Court of Cook County;
however, upon entering the final judgment, the court made an error in the
sentencing order.76 Thereafter, the defendant was taken to the penitentiary
and the State later brought a proceeding to correct Ferguson's sentencing
order, but Ferguson was not sent up from the penitentiary."' The defendant
sought review of the proceeding and challenged that his constitutional right
of confrontation had been violated.78 The Illinois Supreme Court rejected
the defendant's constitutional challenge and noted that "the constitutional
right of confrontation... is designed to secure to an accused the right to
cross-examine the witnesses who testify against him."79 Here, the court
emphasized that the primary purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to
provide for cross-examination and that defendants did not enjoy an unlimited
right to be present at every stage of their case.'
1
In People v. Tennant,"
the Illinois Supreme Court similarly ruled that
despite the difference in language, both the Illinois clause and the Federal
clause are meant to protect the same interest--to secure the defendant's right
of cross-examination. 82 In Tennant, the defendant was convicted of
murder.8 3 In affirming the conviction, the court held that the preliminary
hearing testimony of a witness who died prior to trial, could be used in the
defendant's trial if there was adequate opportunity for cross-examination
during the preliminary hearing." The Tennant court also noted, "the
advantage . . . of personal appearance of the witness at trial is only
secondary to the more essential purpose of cross-examination." 5 Up until
this time, there were no serious confrontation clause challenges brought
against State child shield procedures.
In 1987, the Illinois legislature enacted the Child Shield Act 6 in
reponse to the increased awareness of the problem of sexual abuse of
children. Section 106A-2 of the Act provided for a child's testimony to be

76. Id. at 524.
77. Id. at 524.
78. Id. at 525.

79. Id.

80. Ferguson, 101 N.E.2d at 525.
81. 358 N.E.2d 1116 (I11.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977).
82. See id. at 1119 (emphasis added) (citing in part, 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
(Chadboum rev. ed. 1974)).
83. Tennant, 358 N.E.2d at 1116.
84. Id. at 1120.
85. Id. at 1119 (referring to Dean Wigmore in 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
(Chadboum rev. ed. 1974)).
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 106A-2 (1987) (repealed 1992).

§
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videotaped and admitted in trial against the defendant. 7 Under this
procedure, a defendant could not cross-examine the child during the taping
but could later cross-examine the child at trial."8 Within two years of its
enactment, the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Bastien,s9 held that
section 106A-2 violated the Confrontation Clause because it denied the
defendant's right to cross-examination.' Alternatively, the court noted in
dicta that, had the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation been
implicated, "[a]fter Coy, it is clear that such a procedure which shields the
child witness from facing the defendant during the testimony, is constitutionally acceptable, if at all, only if there is an individual finding that the
witness is in need of such protection." 9 1
After Bastien struck down section 106A-2 of the Child Shield Act, the
Illinois legislature responded by enacting section 106B-1 which allowed a
child to testify via closed circuit television.'
Under the procedure, the
defendant must remain in the courtroom while the child testifies from
outside the courtroom by closed circuit television, though the defendant can
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 541 N.E.2d 670 (Ill.
1989).
90. Id. at 676-77. In Bastien, the defendant, Steven Morris was charged with three
counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Id. at 671. The prosecution filed a motion
seeking to record the testimony of the victim pursuant to section 106A-2 of the Child Shield
Act. ld After the trial court judge, Honorable Robert Bastien denied the motion, the
prosecution filed a motion for a supervisory *order directing the trial judge to grant the
original motion. Id. This motion was denied by the Illinois Supreme Court. Id.
91. Id. at 674. For a discussion of the Coy decision, see supra notes 57-59 and
accompanying text.
92. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 106B-1 (1991) (repealed 1994). However,
section 106B-1 was revalidated in its identical language as 725 ILCS 5/106B-5 (1994). P.A.
88-674 (1994). Section 106B-1 provided:
§ 106B-1. (a)(1) In a proceeding in the prosecution of an offense of
criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual
abuse or aggravated criminal sexual abuse, a court may order that the
testimony of a child victim under the age of 18 years be taken outside the
courtroom and shown in the courtroom by means of a closed circuit
television if:
(i) The testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
(ii) The judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the
courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress
such that the child cannot reasonably communicate or that the child will
suffer severe emotional distress that is likely to cause the child to suffer
severe adverse effects.
(2) Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant, and the
judge may question the child.
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93
communicate with counsel by any appropriate electronic method.
Pursuant to this statute, there has been one conviction in Illinois which was
affirmed on appeal; however, the defendant did not bring a constitutional
challenge under the Confrontation Clause." This challenge was eventually
raised in People v. Fitzpatrick.95

II. PEOPLE V. FrrZPATRICK
A. FACTS

George P. Fitzpatrick was charged by information with seven counts of

aggravated criminal sexual assault" against his four minor grandchil-

dren. 97 The information alleged that between June 1, 1989, and June 1,
1991, the defendant knowingly committed acts of sexual penetration against
his grandchildren, all of whom were under thirteen years of age when the
acts were committed. 98
At trial, the State moved, pursuant to section 106B-1 of the Illinois
Revised Statutes," for an order allowing the four children to testify outside
1°
the courtroom through the use of closed circuit television. 0 The State's
motion alleged that the children would suffer serious emotional or other
severe adverse effects, or might be unable to reasonably communicate, if
1
they had to testify in the presence of the defendant.'
93. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, pars. 106B-1(b)(2)-(3) (repealed 1994).
94. See People v. Weninger, 611 N.E.2d 77 (Il1.App. Ct. 1993). In Weninger, the
defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault of a child. Id. at 81. On
appeal, the defendant argued that the testimony of the prosecution's expert was insufficient
to justify the use of closed circuit television because it had not clearly estatblished that the
child would suffer severe emotional distress if closed circuit television was not used. Id. at
82. However, the court found that this burden had been met. Id. at 83.
95. 633 N.E.2d 685 (IUI. 1994).
96. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-14(b)(1)(1991). Section 12-14(b)(1) states
"The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if: the accused was 17 years of age
or over and commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was under 13 years of
age when the act was committed."
97. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 686. The alleged facts occured fifty miles east of St.
Louis in Carlyle, Illinois where George Fitzpatrick resided after retiring from the construction
business. Eric Herman, Sides Debate Whether Amendment Would End Right to Confront
Accuser, CHI. LAW, Sept. 1994, at 4.
98. Id. The children's father stated that the children were between the ages of two and
five years old when they were molested. Charles Bosworth, Jr., Children's Trauma,
Face-to-Face Testimony Debated, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 9, 1994, at IA.
99. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
100. Fitzpatrick,633 N.E.2d at 686.
101. Id.
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The defendant challenged the Child Shield Act" 2 as being unconstitutional under the Confrontation Clause of the Illinois Constitution because he
was not permitted to meet the witnesses "face-to-face.""3 The trial court
agreed and held that the Child Shield Act""° violated Article I, Section 8
of the Illinois Constitution." The State appealed directly to the Illinois
°6
Supreme Court.
B. THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Child Shield Act was
unconstitutional because it failed to provide the defendant with a face-to-face confrontation with the witnesses against him."0 7 The majority applied
a strict interpretation of Article I, Section 8 and held that the Confrontation
Clause provides a defendant with an absolute right to see all witnesses
face-to-face.0" The court then distinguished Maryland v. Craig"9 as
only applying to the United States Constitution and noted that in interpreting
the Illinois Constitution, Illinois is not obligated to follow federal interpretation of similiar constitutional provisions."0 As persuasive support for this
reasoning, the court offered Commonwealth v. Ludwig,"' where the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court also declined to follow the reasoning in Craig
and held that use of closed circuit television to transmit a child's testimony
violated the defendant's state constitutional right to "face-to-face" confrontation."' Upon this rationale, the majority affirmed the decision of the
circuit court." 3

The dissent, per Justice Freeman,, argued that the right to confront

102. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 106B-1 (1991) (repealed 1994).
103. Id. Fitzpatrick's attorney, Clyde L. Kuehn, argued that the language of the Illinois
provision gave defendants a higher degree of protection than the U.S. Constitution provided.
Herman, supra note 97, at 4.
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 106B-1 (1991) (repealed 1994).
105. Fitzpatrick, 633- N.E.2d at 686.
106. Id. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 603 permits direct appeals to the Illinois Supreme
court in cases in which a statute of the United States or of Illinois has been held invalid by
a trial court. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 603 (1991).
107. Fitzpatrick,633 N.E.2d at 688.
108. Id. at 687. The court found that the language of the provision was clear and
unambiguous and thus dismissed the need to examine legislative history. Id.
109. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
110. Id. at 688.
111. 594 A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991).
112. 633 N.E.2d at 688 (quoting Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 594 A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991)).
For a criticism of the Ludwig decision, see Joseph N. Sacca, Recent Decision, 65 TEMP. L.
REV. 699 (1992).
113. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 688-89.
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witnesses is not an absolute right." 4 First, the dissent criticized the ease
in which the majority rejected the federal decision of Maryland v.
Craig."5 Justice Freeman noted that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause and the comparable Illinois clause both protect the defendant's right
to a face-to-face encounter and, though not bound by federal interpretation
of similar constitutional provisions, there must be some substantive basis for
departing from federal precedent. 116 Granting that the Illinois Constitution expressly provides for a "face-to-face" confrontation, Justice Freeman
argued that the federal and Illinois provisions are synonymous. 7 By
tracing the long history of the Federal Confrontation Clause,"' Justice
Freeman explained how the Sixth Amendment has been interpreted to
convey a face-to-face meeting and how no distinction should been drawn
between the two provisions on the basis that one expressly provides for what
Additionally, the dissent adopts the
the other implicitly intends. 9
reasoning of Craig as support for the contention that the right to confront
witnessess is not an absolute right.'20 As in Craig, Justice Freeman
demonstrated the flexibility of the right to confront witnesses by pointing
out the exceptions to hearsay which have always been recognized.' 2 '
Similar to the justification for hearsay exceptions, curtailment of the
right of confrontation is justified where legitimate policy considerations are
present.1 2 In order to determine whether a child's testimony via closed
circuit television unjustly denies a defendant's right of confrontation, the
dissent balances the importance of the State's interest against the degree of
deprivation to the essence of the Confrontation Clause. 123 With regard to
the Child Shield Act,U the dissent noted the compelling interest of the
State in prosecuting child sexual abusers and protecting child victims from
emotional trauma associated with testifying in the presence of their

114. Id. at 691 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 690 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 689-90.
117. Id.

118. For a detailed discussion of the history of the Federal Confrontation Clause, see
supra notes 12-56 and accompanying text.
119. Fitzpatrick,633 N.E.2d at 689 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 690. For a discussion of the Craig reasoning, see supra notes 61-71 and
accompanying text.
121. Id. For a discussion of the hearsay exceptions to the right of confrontation, see
supra notes 24-56 and accompanying text.
122. Id. at 691.
123. Id.
124. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 106B-1 (1991) (repealed 1994).
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attackers.'25 Moreover, the procedure of closed circuit televised testimony
preserves the reliability of the evidence by requiring that the child's
testimony be subject to cross examination and the demeanor of the child be
observed by the fact finder." Because the essence of the confrontation
clause protection is not abridged, the defendant's right to a face-to-face
encounter should yield to the compelling State interests.' 27 Thus, Justice
Freeman concluded that the Child Shield Act 2 ' does not violate the
defendant's right of confrontation under the Illinois Constitution.'29
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT'S

DECISION

The majority in Fitzpatrick interpreted the language in the Illinois
Confrontation Clause as conferring an "express and unqualified right to a
face-to-face confrontation with the witnesses."' 3 ° This strict adherence to
the literal meaning of the Confrontation Clause failed to take into account
not only highly persuasive federal authority, but also mandatory Illinois
precedent. More specifically, an examination of the history of the
Confrontation Clause reveals that the provision protects three main rights:
the right of cross-examination;' the right of the accused to see witnesses;
and the right to have the witnesses face the accused.'3 2 Granted it is the
court's duty to protect these rights, it is also the court's duty to take into
account competing interest of public policy.'33 Competing with the
defendant's right of confrontation is the State's interest in protecting
children from severe emotional distress associated with testifying in the
presence of those who have sexually abused them."3 United States
Supreme Court rulings on this issue are highly persuasive authority that the
right of confrontation is not absolute. 3 Secondly, Illinois courts have
already recognized limitations to the Confrontation Clause through existing
hearsay exceptions; thus, allowing sexually abused children to testify via
125. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 691 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 106B-1 (1991) (repealed 1994).
129. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 692.
130. Id. at 687.
131. People v. Ferguson, 101 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ill. 1951) ("the constitutional right of
confrontation... is designed to secure to an accused the right to cross-examine the witnesses

who testify against him.") Id.

132. See People v. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d 685, 688 (Ii. 1994); People v. Tennant, 358
N.E.2d 1116, 1119 (II1. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977).
133. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849-50 (1990).
134. See, e.g., Craig, 497 U.S. at 852.
135. Fitzpatrick,633 N.E.2d at 690 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
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closed circuit television would not be the first intrusion into the right of
confrontation."3 Moreover, in order to protect the interests of children,
the court would only have to restrict the defendants' right to make witnesses
face them; thus the court would not have to infringe upon the more
important rights of the Confrontation Clause. 37 Finally, the underlying
purpose of the Confrontation Clause, furthering the truth-seeking function
of criminal trials, is better served by allowing sexually abused children to
testify outside the presence of the defendant. 3 For these reasons, the
majority should have construed the Illinois Confrontation Clause as yielding
slightly to permit testimony via closed circuit television where necessary to
protect a child witness from trauma that would be caused by testifying in the
presence of the defendant.
A. FEDERAL PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY

The majority chose not to follow the reasoning of the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Confrontation Clause. Justice
Bilandic ruled that, in interpreting the Illinois Constitution, the Illinois
Supreme Court is not bound by the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of similar federal constitutional provisions.' 39 Justice
Bilandic then distinguished the United States Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment on the basis of a difference in phrasing." The
court reasoned that Craig was not applicable because the Sixth Amendment
states, "the accused shall enjoy the right . . .to be confronted with the
witnesses against him," whereas the Illinois provision states, "the accused
shall have the right . ..to meet the witnesses face-to-face."' 4' Despite
this difference in phrasing, the court ignored both federal and Illinois case
law that establish that the two provisions have the exact same meaning.
The majority reasoned that it did not have to follow federal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause based on People v. DiGuida,142 in which
the Illinois Supreme Court held that, where the language of a State
136. People v. Fidler, 258 N.E.2d 359, 361 (Il. 1970) (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 404-05 (1965)) ("In Pointer, the Court noted that the rule is not absolute and that
exceptions have always been recognized.").
137. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 851; see also Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 691 (Freeman, J.,
dissenting) ("Though the process of eliciting testimony is altered'. . . [t]he defendant is not
denied the substance of the constitutional protection--the right to cross-examine the
witness.").
138. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 691 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 688.
140. Id. at 688.
141. Id. at 687-88.
142. Id. at 687 (citing People v. DiGuida, 604 N.E.2d 336 (Il1. 1992)).
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constitutional provision or the legislative history shows that the framers
intended a different construction, the Illinois Supreme Court will construe
state constitutional provisions differently than similiar federal provisions.143 As DiGuida suggests, evidence of a different intended meaning
is necessary to justify interpreting a state constitutional provision differently
than a similar federal provision."
However, in Fitzpatrick, the majority ruled that, because Article I,
Section 8 of the Illinois Constitution was "clear and unambiguous, the clause
will be given effect without resorting to other aids for construction ... ."143
Given the wide variance in other jurisdictions' interpretations of the right "to
meet the witnesses face-to-face," it is questionable whether this language is
"clear and unambiguous."'" However, the Illinois Supreme Court reached
its interpretation of the Illinois Confrontation Clause without examining any
Illinois Supreme Court cases that previously interpreted Article I, Section 8
and without examining the extensive body of United States Supreme Court
cases that previously interpreted the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. The
court should have examined the historical background of each provision to
determine the meaning of the two clauses.
Granted the Illinois provision expressly provides a right to face the
witnesses, federal interpretation of the Sixth Amendment suggests that the
Federal Confrontation Clause conveys the same right. One of the first
federal decisions to describe the meaning of the Federal Confrontation
Clause was Kirby v. United States.4 7 In Kirby, Justice Harlan noted, "a
fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses cannot be proved
143.
144.
145.
provided

Id.

See People v. DiGuida, 604 N.E.2d 336, 342 (Ill.
1992) (emphasis added).
Id.
Fitpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 687. The court found that ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8
an "express and unqualified right to a face-to-face confrontation with witnesses."

146. Compare Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981 (Ind. 1991) (determining that the right
to meet witnesses face-to-face under the Indiana Constitution provides more detailed
protection than the Federal Confrontation Clause) and Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 549 A.2d
281 (Pa. 1991) (ruling that unlike its federal counterpart, the Pennsylvania Confrontation
Clause emphatically requires a face-to-face confrontation) with Turner v. Commonwealth,
767 S.W.2d 557 (Ky. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989) (finding no significant
difference between the confrontation rights protected by the Federal Constitution and the
face-to-face meeting with witnesses guaranteed by the Kentucky Constitution) and State v.
Schaal, 806 S.W.2d 659 (Mo. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1075 (1992) (ruling
that the confrontational rights guaranteed under the Missouri Constitution, which provide the
right to meet the witnesses face-to-face, are the same as the rights protected under the Sixth
Amendment).
147. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899). For a description of Kirby, see supra
notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
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against an accused .. except by witnesses who confront him at the trial,
upon whom he can look while being tried, [and] whom he is entitled to
crossexamine."' 14 Moreover, in Dowdell v. United States, 49 the Court
described the Sixth Amendment as protecting a defendant's light to meet
witnesses face-to-face at trial. 5° Additionally, in Coy v. Iowa, Justice
Scalia described the Court's view of the Sixth Amendment stating, "[w]e
have never doubted . . . that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the
defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier
of fact."'' s Thus, contrary to the majority's basis for distinction, the
Federal Confrontation Clause has been interpreted to require a face-to-face
meeting, despite the difference in phrasing.
Furthermore, the Illinois Supreme Court has previously interpreted
Article I, Section 8 to mean the same as its federal counterpart. Specifically, in People v. Tennant,'52 the Illinois Supreme Court ruled, that
despite the difference in language, both the Illinois clause and the Federal
clause are meant to protect the same interest--to secure the defendant's right
of cross-examination.' 53 Although, in interpreting the Illinois Constitution,
the Illinois Supreme Court is not obligated to follow the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of similar Constitutional provisions, there
should be some substantial basis for deciding not to."5 With regard to
Illinois's Confrontation Clause, other than a difference in wording, there is
no substantial basis to distinguish it from the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Throughout Illinois' past interpretations of constitutional
provisions, the supreme court has chosen to adopt the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of similar Federal Constitutional proviAdditionally, Justice Freeman, dissenting in Fitzpatrick, noted
sions.'
that the court had just recently held that a "difference in wording offers no

148. 174 U.S. at 55.
149. 221 U.S. 325 (1911).
150. Id. at 330.
151. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988).
152. 358 N.E.2d 1116 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 910 (1952). For a discussion of
Tennant, see supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
153. Tennant, 358 N.E.2d at 1119.
154. See People v. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d 685, 690 (Ill. 1994) (Freeman, J., dissenting).
155. People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 156 (Ill. 1984); see also People ex rel. Hanrahan
v. Power, 295 N.E.2d 472 (Ill. 1973) (holding that provisions against self-incrimination in
both the United States and Illinois constitutions differ in language rather than substance and
should receive the same general construction); People v. Jackson, 176 N.E.2d 803 (Il1.1961),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 985 (1962) "We have indicated before that we will follow the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court on identical state and federal constitutional
problems." Id.
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substantial basis to support a conclusion that Illinois' [Double Jeopardy]
[c]lause provides broader protections than does its federal counterpart."156
Therefore, the Fitzpatrick Court, in construing the Illinois Confrontation
Clause, should have followed Marylandv. Craig'sinterpretation of the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause because the history of the two
provisions shows that their meanings are identical.
B. RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION IS NOT ABSOLUTE

Contrary to Craig, Justice Bilandic endorses an unqualified right to a
face-to-face confrontation. 5 ' In so ruling, the Court fails to acknowledge
prior decisions that suggest that the right is not absolute. Particularly, in
People v. Fiddler,' the supreme court noted that Illinois has always
recognized exceptions to the constitutional right to confrontation.' 59 The
most common example is the admission of hearsay exceptions against a
defendant.
The Fitzpatrick court's literal interpretation that Article I, Section 8
conveys an unqualifed right to confront witnesses face-to-face, is irreconcilable with the existence of hearsay exceptions.'6 Namely, in the admission
of dying declarations and co-conspirator statements, the defendant does not
have the opportunity of a face-to-face meeting with the declarant.1 61
However, the Fitzpatrick majority failed to acknowledge these well
established exceptions to the Confrontation Clause.
In addition to exceptions for hearsay, the United States Supreme Court
has noted that the right of confrontation "is not absolute and may, in
156. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 690 (Freeman, J.,
dissenting) (citing People v. Levin,
623 N.E.2d 317, 328 (Il. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 94 (1994)).
157. See Fitzpatrick,633 N.E.2d at 687.
158. 258 N.E.2d 359 (Ill.
1970). In Fiddler,the defendant was convicted for murder
based in part upon a statement taken from a certified copy of a coroner's death certificate.
Id. The Supreme Court held that the evidence of the victim's cause of death, offered through
a statement from a certified copy of a coroner's death certificate was inadmissible against
the defendant. Id. at 361.
159. See id. at 361 (citing People v. Dolgin, 114 N.E.2d 389 (Ill.
1953) (holding that
copies of public documents and official statements made by public officers in the
performance of their official duties are admissible into evidence as exceptions to hearsay);
see also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (holding the right to confrontation may be lost
by a defendant's consent or misconduct at trial); People v. Love, 142 N.E. 204 (Ill.
1923);
Sokel v. People, 72 N.E. 382 (Ill.
1904); Tucker v. People, 13 N.E. 809 (Ill.
1887).
160. See Sacca, supra note 112 (applying the same argument to the Commonwealth v.
Ludwig decision); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 848 (1990) (stating that "a
literal reading of the Confrontation Clause would abrogate virtually every hearsay exception
.") (quoting in part from Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)).
161. Sacca, supra note 112, at 709.
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appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the
criminal trial process."' 62 As observed in Maryland v. Craig, society's
interest in the successful prosecution of those persons who sexually abuse
innocent children, and the interest in protecting child witnesses from the
trauma associated with testifying at trial are indeed legitmate and compelling
interests. 6 3 The United States Supreme Court has held that the Confrontation Clause should bow to accommodate these interests." 4 Likewise, the
Illinois Confrontation Clause should also bow to accommodate these
interests because the two provisions are intended to serve the same purpose.
C. CHILD SHIELD ACT PRESERVES PRIMARY PURPOSE OF CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE

Though allowing child testimony via closed circuit television might
infringe slightly on the Confrontation -Clause, the primary purpose of
confrontation would still be intact. On the contrary, the Fitzpatrick majority
places a great deal of importance on the right to have witnesses face
defendants. 65 The court based this finding on the assertion that the
language of the Confrontation Clause is clear and unambiguous."6
Moreover, the court reached this determination without examining one prior
Illinois case that interpreted the Confrontation Clause. In deciding a
constitutional issue of this magnitude it is odd that the court ignored all
previous interpretations of this provision.
The history of the Confrontation Clause suggests that the main purpose
of confrontation is to ensure the reliability of evidence so as to safeguard the
truth-seeking goal of trial. 67 An examination of both Illinois and federal
common law reveals that this purpose is best achieved through the use of
cross-examination. 168

162. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
163. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 853-55, noted in People v. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d 685, 691
(I11.1994) (Freeman, J., dissenting).
164. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 855.
165. See Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 687. But see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316
(1974) "The opponent demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the
witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination, which
cannot be had except by the direct . . . putting of questions and obtaining immediate
answers." Id. (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395 (3d ed. 1940)).
166. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 687.
167. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 845, noted in Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 691 (Freeman, J.,
dissenting).
168. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (stating that cross-examination is
"the greatest legal engine ever invented for the dicovery of truth.") (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)).
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In People v. Ferguson,'69one of the first cases to interpret the Illinois
clause, the Illinois Supreme Court unequivically stated that the "constitutional right of confrontation is designed to secure to an accused the right to
cross-examine the witnesses who testify against him."1 7 ° This premise was
restated by the supreme court in Tennant, where the court held that the
"main and essential purpose of confontation is to secure... the opportunity
17
of cross-examination." '
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the
Confrontation Clause ensures the reliability of the evidence by: (1) requiring
that witnesses give their statements under oath; (2) requiring that witnessess
submit to cross-examination; and (3) requiring that the jury be allowed to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses so as to assess the credibility of their
testimony.'
The procedure of allowing children to testify via closed
circuit television comports with all three of these requirements. 73 The
child must testify under oath, submit to cross-examination, and the jury can
observe the child's demeanor through the television.
Though the right of cross-examination is the main right protected by
the Confrontation Clause, it is also true that Article I, Section 8 preserves
the right of defendants to see witnesses and the right of defendants to have
the witnesses face them. 7 4 All this being true, the Child Shield Act 175
only infringes upon the right to have witnesses face the defendant.
Upholding the Child Shield Act 176 would still uphold the right of the
defendant to see the witness and, more importantly, the right of cross-exami77
nation.
Thus, the question becomes: Does the right to have witnesses face a
defendant outweigh any state interest to protect children from severe
emotional trauma associated with facing those who have sexually abused
them? Where the defendant still enjoys the right to see the child and to
169. 101 N.E.2d 522 (I11.
1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 910 (1952).
170. Id. at 525.
171. People v. Tennant, 358 N.E.2d 1116, 1119 (Ill. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918
(1977) (quoting 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1395 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)).
172. Green, 399 U.S. at 158.
173. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 851 (1990) (ruling that Maryland's Child
Shield Act preserves the three main requirements of confrontation). Compare MD. CODE
ANN., [CTS. & JUD. PROC.] § 9-102 (1989) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 106B-1 (1991)
(repealed 1994).
174. People v. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d 685, 689 (Ill.
1994) (Freeman, J., dissenting).
175. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 106B-1 (1991) (repealed 1994).
176. Id.
177. Fitzpatrick,633 N.E.2d at 691. "The defendant is not denied the substance of the
constitutional protection- the right to cross-examine the witness." Id.
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cross-examine, any additional benefits from having the child face the
defendant are minimal in relation to the risk of subjecting the child to severe
This slight infringment into the confrontational right
emotional distress.'
does not jeopardize the core of the protection and is justified in the weight
of the state's interest. Therefore, the Fitzpatick court should have upheld
the Child Shield Act 7 9 as not violative of the defendant's confrontation
right under the Illinois Constitution.

IV. REACTION OF THE ILLINOIS LEGISLATURE
Less than a week after the Fitzpatrickdecision came down on February
17, 1994, state legislators initiated proposals to reverse the supreme court's
ruling."s Several identical resolutions were made in both the House and
the Senate to amend Article 1, Section 8 of the Illinois Constitution.'
Each resolution proposed to change the language of the Illinois Confrontation Clause so that the provision would be the same as the Federal Confrontation Clause.
The procedure which allows the legislature to amend the constitution
is stated in Article 14, Section 2 of the Constitution.8 2 According to this
178. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). "The opponent demands confrontation,
not for the idle purposes of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for
the purpose of cross-examination ..... Id. (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395 (3d
ed. 1940)).
179. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 106B-1 (1991) (repealed 1994).
180. David Heckelman, Amendment would reinstate child-abuse victims' TV testimony,
CHI. DAILY LAW BULL., Feb. 24, 1994, at 1. Two proposals, House Joint Resolution
Constitutional Amendment [hereinafter "HJRCA° ] 25 and HJRCA 26, declared an express
intent to reverse the Supreme Court's decision of People v. Fitzpatrick. Id.
181. See H.R.J. Res. Const. Amend. 25, 88th Leg., 2d Sess., 3 LEGIS. SYNOPSIS & DIG.
2332 (Il. 1994); H.R.J. Res. Const. Amend. 26, 88th Leg., 2d Sess., 3 LEGIS. SYNOPSIS &
DIG. 2332 (11. 1994); H.R.J. Res. Const. Amend. 27, 88th Leg., 2d Sess., 3 LEGIs.
SYNoPsIs & DIG. 2332 (Ill. 1994) ; S.J. Res. Const. Amend. 123, 88th Leg., 2d Sess., 3
LEGIs. SYNOPsIs & DIG. 2321 (Ill. 1994). H.R.J. Res. Const. Amend. 25 and 26 were
introduced on Feb. 23; S.J. Res. Const. Amend. 123 was introduced on Mar. 2, and H.R.J.
Res. Const. Amend. 27 was introduced on Mar. 3, 1994.
182. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. XIV, § 2 (1970). Section 2 provides:
Amendments by General Assembly
(a) Amendments to this Constitution may be initiated in either house of the
General Assembly. Amendments shall be read in full on three different
days in each house and reproduced before the vote is taken on final
passage. Amendments approved by the vote of three-fifths of the members
elected to each house shall be submitted to the electors at the general
election next occuring at least six months after such legislative approval,
unless withdrawn by a vote of a majority of the members elected to each
house.
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provision, the General Assembly must approve a proposal by a three-fifths
vote at least six months before it is submitted to the Illinois voters in the
November election.1 13 The proposed amendment would then become
effective if approved by either three-fifths of those voting on the question
or a majority of those voting in the election.'
Of the four proposed resolutions, Senate Joint Resolution Constitutional
Amendment 123 was the one that eventually was placed on the November
ballot.185 Senator George Shadid of Peoria sponsored the resolution which
originally sought only to allow the General Assembly to provide an
alternative for child victims to testify in court despite the face-to-face
wording in the constitution. " However, the proposal was later amended
to change Article I, Section 8 of the constitution so as to provide an accused
the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her instead of
having the right to meet the witnesses face-to-face. 8 On April 14, 1994,
it passed in the Senate by a vote of 56-0-0 and on May 6, it passed in the
House by a vote of 112-0-0. 188
Thereafter, the Child Witness Amendment was passed by a majority of
voters in the November 8, 1994 election and People v. Fitzpatrick was
consequently reversed. 8 9 According to the State Board of Elections, the
votes in favor of the amendment amounted to 1,525,525 and those against
the amendment amounted to 906,383.' 90
(b) Amendments proposed by the General Assembly shall be published
with explanations, as provided by law, at least one month preceding the
vote thereon by the electors. The vote on the proposed amendment or
amendments shall be on a separate ballot. A proposed amendment shall
become effective as the amendment provides if approved by either
three-fifths of those voting on the question or a majority of those voting in

Id.

the election.

183. id.
184. Id.
185. See S.J. Res. Const. Amend. 181, 88th Leg., 2D Sess., 3 LEGIs. SYNOPSIS & DIG.
2359 (Ill. 1994) (setting forth the explanation, arguments, and ballot form of the proposed
amendment for the 1994 general election).
186. See Bosworth, Jr., supra note 98 at IA.
187. S.J. Res. Const. Amend. 123, 88th Leg., 3 LEGIS. SYNOPSIS & DIG. (Ill. 1994).
Adopted as amended March 31, 1994.
188. S.J. Res. Const. Amend. 123, 88th Leg., 2d Sess., 3 LEGIS. SYNOPSIS & DIG. 2321
(ill. 1994).
189. ILLINOIS STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, PUBLICATION OF THE OFFICIAL VOTE OF THE
GENERAL ELECTION ON Nov. 8, 1994 at vii.
190. Id. As provided by ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 2, passage of the proposed amendment
required approval of 60% of those voting on the issue and votes in favor of the amendment
amounted to 62.73% of those voting on the question. Id.
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF ILLINOIS' TREATMENT OF THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE

The passage of the constitutional amendment to Article I, Section 8
allowed the General Assembly to revalidate the Child Shield Law" that
was struck down by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Fitzpatrick.'9
Thus, Illinois will be able to protect child sexual abuse victims from the
trauma and intimidation associated with testifying in the defendant's
presence. Opponents of the amendment believe that it is overly broad and
that it erodes the right of all defendants to face their accusers. 93 Additionally, critics of child shield laws feel that the problem of children
becoming traumatized by testifying in the defendant's presence is exaggerated and that children are inclined to fabricate stories of sexual abuse if not
required to face their alleged abusers." 9 However, these criticisms are
misguided for several reasons.
First, the amendment is no broader than the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Prosecutors must still comport with all the
requirements which have been applied to the Federal Confrontation Clause.
Implicit in the defendant's right to be confonted with the witnesses against
him or her is the requirement of a face-to-face meeting with the witnesses. 3 The only way in which this requirement may be abridged is when
"necessary to further an important public policy and only where the
reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured."'" Furthermore, in cases
involving child sexual abuse victims, there must be a specific judicial
finding that the child witness would be traumatized by the presence of the
defendant and that the use of closed circuit television is necessary to protect
the welfare of the child, before the face-to-face requirement may be

191. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 106B-1 (1991) (repealed 1994).
192. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 106B-1 (1991) was repealed by P.A. 88-674, but was
revalidated in its identical language by P.A. 88-674 and became effective December 14, 1994
under 725 ILCS 5/106B-5 (1994).
193. Herman, supra note 97, at 4. Among the opponents is the Illinois State Bar
Association. ISBA President David Decker stated that "the prime reason that the state bar
voted to oppose it was that the ability to see and confront witnesses face-to-face was entirely
eliminated." Id. But see Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990) "That the
face-to-face confrontation requirement is not absolute does not, of course, mean that it may
easily be dispensed with." Id.
194. See Bosworth, Jr., supra note 98 at IA.

195. For a discussion of the requirement of a face-to-face meeting implicit in the right
to be confonted with one's witnesses see supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
196. Craig, 497 U.S. at 850 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988); Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
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infringed. 97 Thus, the concern that the amendment will totally eliminate
an accused's right to confront his or her witnesses face-to-face is unwarranted.
Second, the disfavor of child shield laws because of disbelief in the
problem of children being traumatized and the concern of children being
"coached" to testify against a wrongfully accused is ill-advised. It is well
documented that the risk of emotional harm to children who testify in front
of their abusers is quite serious.'" Children who testify in the presence
of their abusers are likely to suffer prolonged emotional consequences such
as nightmares, depression, and guilt."
Thus, child shield laws are
necessary to protect these children from further emotional harm.
Granted that children may be susceptible to suggestion, a defense
attorney may always extensively cross-examine a child so that the fact-finder
may assess the credibility of the testimony.' ° Moreover, the right to
confront witnesses is not the right to intimidate.'O A defendant's intimidation of a child witness does not further the truth-seeking goal of a trial
and should not be condoned by an absolute guarantee to have witnesses face
the accused.
In fact, many prosecutors prefer not to use closed circuit testimony. 2'
A prosecutor's case is stronger if "the child can come into court, confront
the offender face to face, make an identification and testify about [the
allegation]."' ' Thus, it is doubtful that the amendment will result in
wide-spread use of closed circuit testimony in child abuse cases. Rather, in
the small number of cases where a child is unable to testify in the presence
of the accused, child shield laws provide an additional means for prosecuting sexual abuse crimes while protecting child witnesses from further
emotional trauma.
CONCLUSION

Child sexual abuse and the problems associated with the prosecution of

197. Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-56.
198. See Marchese, supra note 3; Bosworth Jr., supra note 98 at IA.
199. Marchese, supra note 3, at 416. For a discussion of the effects suffered by child
witnesses, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
200. For a recent treatise which examines the credibility of child witnesses, see
LucY

S. MCGOUGH, CHILD WITNESSES: FRAGILE VOICES IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
(1994).
201. Eric Herman, Sides Debate Whether Amendment Would End Right to Confront
Accuser, CHI. LAW., Sept. 1994, at 5.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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this crime are serious concerns of our society. However, the use of closed
circuit television as a means of protecting children from trauma associated
with testifying at trials for sexual assault has received varying judicial treatment among jurisdictions. Though the Illinois Supreme Court could have
upheld the Illinois Child Shield Act 204 under the previous Illinois Confrontation Clause if it had relied on the better reasoning of the dissent, it chose
to strike down the law. However, the use of closed circuit television was
ultimately upheld by the Illinois legislature through amending the Illinois
Constitution. The new language of Article I, Section 8 does not drastically
alter the substance of a defendant's right of confrontation. Rather, it merely
allows courts to balance this interest with society's interest in protecting
minor children from the emotional trauma associated with testifying in the
presence of their attacker.
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204. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 106B-1 (1991) (repealed).
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